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Over the course of the twentieth century the welfare state emerged as one of the most 
conspicuous features of the modern polity. Together with a market mediated economy with 
concentrated private ownership of the principal productive assets, and political systems with 
multi-party elections and fairly extensive individual rights, the welfare state helps define the 
basic character of contemporary developed societies. The implications of human induced climate 
change now pose significant challenges for each of these institutional pillars – raising profound 
questions about current economic practices, processes of political decision-making and welfare 
arrangements.  
 
In this chapter we focus on linkages between climate change and the welfare state. Since welfare 
states are almost uniquely a feature of developed societies, we ignore all international aspects of 
climate change, unless these impinge directly or indirectly on the welfare states of the West. 
Unlike most other chapters in this Handbook, there is no systematic academic research, literature 
or scholarly network on this particular topic, so we must gather material and build our arguments 
from what is available (but see Gough et al. 2008). In the absence of reliable comparative data, 
we have mainly used research findings on the UK.  
 
The argument will proceed in three steps: first, a brief characterization of the contemporary 
welfare state; second, a discussion of the challenges to the welfare state from climate change; 
and third, rethinking the welfare state in light of the decarbonisation imperative. 
 
1. Contemporary welfare arrangements
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Social policy is often defined as the public management of social risks, usually idiosyncratic 
risks: individually unpredictable but collectively predictable, such as ill-health or unemployment. 
In order to meet those risks, welfare states transfer the allocation of goods and services from 
market determination to political determination. They substitute transfer payments and public 
services as “social rights of citizenship” for income and services allocated by the market. Today, 
in the long-standing OECD member states, average social expenditure, excluding education, 
accounts for around 23 per cent of GDP. This expansion began in the first three decades after the 
Second World War, but it has continued since. Despite retrenchment, social spending has 
increased by five percentage points of GDP in the quarter century since 1980. Thus all rich 
OECD countries have extensive social security systems covering old age, disability, sickness, 
unemployment and other contingencies, plus comprehensive public education systems. Most, 
excepting notably the US, also have universal health care entitlements and child allowances and 
other family programmes.  
 
The post-war period was exceptionally favourable for welfare states for several reasons. Capital 
was relatively immobile in the initial period of the post-war settlement, so there was considerable 
room for redistribution and this was exploited by governments of all partisan complexions. The 
experience of war and depression paved the way for the emergence of a Keynesian consensus 
promoting high levels of employment, high tax and expenditures levels and a dominant ideology 
favouring government management of demand and the business cycle in capitalist economies. 
Distributional conflicts were mitigated by a comparatively symmetric balance of power between 
the interest organisations of labour and capital and by relatively high rates of economic growth. 
Partisan competition as well as system competition in a world now divided by an Iron Curtain 
further fuelled welfare state expansion. Under these circumstances, social benefits were 
everywhere significantly raised, existing programmes were extended to cover new groups of 
beneficiaries and entirely new schemes were adopted. As a consequence, welfare state coverage 
as well as spending levels rose dramatically with important impacts on policy outcomes 
including a decrease in inequality and poverty, the ‘de-commodification’ of labour, the guarantee 
of social rights and improved macro-economic performance (Goodin et al). 
 
Despite this massive expansion, however, the institutional differences laid down in the era of 
welfare state consolidation persisted or transformed in path-dependent ways. Esping-Andersen in 
his classic Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism identified three quite distinct ‘welfare state 
regimes: (1) a social democratic or Scandinavian model manifesting high levels of 
decommodification, cross-class solidarity resulting in a system of generous universal benefits 
and a strong state role; (2) a liberal or Anglophone model, with typically low levels of 
decommodification, more targeted welfare benefits and a strong preference for private welfare 
spending; and, (3) a conservative/continental model manifesting a moderate-high degree of 
decommodification, a narrower sphere of solidarity related to occupational status and a 
commitment to subsidiarity and the preservation of traditional family structures typical of the 
countries of continental Europe (Esping-Andersen 1990). There has been considerable empirical 
support for this regime model since then. 
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In the 1970s and early 1980s, the ‘golden age’ of welfare capitalism began to falter, and the 
‘silver age’ began to dawn. The shift to a predominantly service economy and economic 
globalisation entailed tighter constraints on public revenues, while societal modernisation and 
changes in the economic structure produced mounting social needs, new risk patterns and new 
priorities for social policy intervention, with education and social service provision on top of the 
list. This had to be managed by nation-states whose sovereignty, autonomy and tax revenues 
were compromised by globalisation. Nevertheless, the overall picture since the oil and stagflation 
crises of the 1970s has been one of resilience. This can be explained by recognising the way that 
welfare states shape political interests, institutions and forms of stratification, which then call 
forth political mobilisations that defend and extend these social programmes. In general terms, 
welfare states are too important to users and voters to cut back drastically. This can also explain 
the strong persistence of distinct welfare state regimes within the OECD.  
 
The overall picture today then is one of slowly rising public expenditure on the welfare state, 
with cross-national variations fitting the traditional league table notion of a Nordic and 
continental vanguard of big spenders and an English speaking rearguard of lower spending 
countries. The share of social spending in total government expenditure also increased from 39 
per cent in 1980 to well over 52 per cent in 2005 - the welfare state has proved much more 
immune to expenditure retrenchment than other public policy areas such as education, defence, 
and economic affairs. Yet, spending has not kept up with rising social needs, driven by 
demography, family change and socio-economic shifts. By comparing indicators of social rights 
in 1995 with peak years, it is evident that retrenchment is pervasive. Governments have 
substantially scaled back pension promises in Italy, Sweden and Germany, and sick pay and 
unemployment benefits in the Anglophone countries. Redistributive outcomes still vary widely: 
the Gini coefficient varies from 0.38 in the US to 0.23 in Denmark and Sweden – a difference of 
over 65 per cent, and the poverty rate in the US is over three times higher. But in all countries, 
welfare states effect some progressive redistribution of individual market incomes. 
 
Coming issues 
Before discussing climate change we should briefly note two other critical challenges to 
contemporary welfare states: demographic change and the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. 
In all countries life expectancy continues to rise faster than predicted resulting in a larger share 
of elderly in the population. Many European countries also exhibit fertility rates below 
replacement rate and thus workforces shrinking in absolute size. Ceteris paribus this engenders a 
growing demand for pensions and increasingly costly medical procedures. Since public pension 
systems have been predominantly organized on the ‘pay as you go’ model, the next generation of 
workers will be required to support a much larger cohort of elderly. However ceteris is not 
always paribus: social democratic and liberal regimes have higher birth rates than continental 
countries on average, and many countries have successfully experimented with adaptive changes, 
for example raising the age of retirement in line with rising life expectancy.  
 
These demographic pressures will be magnified by the continuing fallout from 2008 financial 
crisis. Alongside the ‘automatic stabilizers’ (increased spending on unemployment and other 
social benefits plus reduced tax receipts), states have implemented large discretionary fiscal 
stimuli to prevent a major depression in the real economy and have spent unprecedented sums 
bailing out banks and other financial institutions. As a result of these three shifts, average 
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government debt in the advanced G20 countries will increase by some 30 percentage points of 
GDP from 2008-2014, with higher rises in the UK and US. The implications for Western welfare 
states are sombre. Unless taxes can be raised substantially, there will be intense pressure to cut 
resources across much of the welfare state. Nor will this pressure ease quickly; the British 
Institute for Fiscal Studies speaks of ‘two parliaments of pain’. Thus a ‘fiscal crisis of the 
welfare state’, much discussed in the 1970s, has returned as a central political issue. According 
to Ferguson this may herald long-term stagnation in Western economies most exposed to the 
financial crisis. And this could include Britain, the US, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, and 
others. This is the potential scenario within which we must consider the impact of climate 
change. 
 
2. The Challenge of Climate Change  
 
Climate change poses direct and indirect threats to public welfare in developed states. Although 
poorer countries in the South are especially vulnerable, developed countries will also be exposed 
to impacts from rising sea levels, extreme weather events, altered temperature and rainfall 
patterns, and the disruption of ecological systems (Intergovernmental 2007a). This will generate 
risks to life, settlements, infrastructure, industrial and agricultural productivity (hydro power 
output, crop yields), and so on. Direct risks are expected to affect particularly a) Australia and 
southern regions of Europe and the US, where heat and water stress will grow, and b) coastal 
regions vulnerable to rising sea-levels, such as the Netherlands. Over coming decades other parts 
of the developed world may experience more dramatic temperature changes – for example arctic 
areas of Canada and Europe. This will have significant impacts on local livelihoods and ways of 
life, but populations in these northern regions remain small. 
 
Indirect risks include spill over from climate change impacts elsewhere: for example, the 
potential for distress migration from tropical regions. According to a report by Javier Solana and 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU should anticipate ‘a flood of climate change migrants’. Broader 
concerns include the possibility that climate change may lead to: 1) international conflicts 
(particularly over water); 2) a breakdown of the global trade regime (if agreement on mitigation 
proves elusive and conflicts generated by climate-related ‘border tax adjustments’ get out of 
control); and/or 3) significantly higher food prices. In such cases economic losses could affect 
overall levels of social welfare in developed states 
 
Focusing more particularly on the operation of contemporary welfare states, climate change 
presents three basic challenges to the existing institutional configuration: first, it introduces an 
expanded set of risks and distributional problems which will require active management by 
social institutions; second, it opens the possibility for conflict between climate-oriented measures 
on the one hand and traditional social policy goals on the other; and third, it suggests that the 
economic model that has underpinned the current welfare state is unsustainable. Let us look at 
each of these in turn. 
 
a) Expanded risks and distributional conflicts 
 
Many of the risks associated with climate change are not new (societies have always had to cope 
with floods, droughts, hurricanes and so on), but their incidence, severity and distribution will 
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change, and welfare policies will have to be adjusted to cope. Moreover, the affects of climate 
change, of the measures taken to respond to a changing climate (adaptation), and of the policies 
put in place to slow further change (mitigation) could have profound distributional implications. 
Climate risks and burdens will press unevenly on different regions, economic sectors, 
communities and individuals. The same may be true for adaptation and mitigation costs. So 
measures will be required to ensure an equitable sharing of risks and costs. For example, what 
support will be given to farmers in regions where agricultural production comes under stress? 
How will the burden of adjusting settlement patterns in flood plains or vulnerable costal areas be 
distributed? How will workers be assisted in industrial sectors that are declining as a direct result 
of climate policy (for instance coal extraction)? How will regional concerns be balanced when 
local economies are differentially related to the causes and impacts of climate change? Should 
households with high carbon footprints unalterable in the short term be compensated for high 
carbon prices, and if so how? What will be the social entitlements of climate refugees? 
 
b) Tension among policy objectives 
 
Governments typically struggle to reconcile diverse policy goals and competing claims on the 
public purse. Climate change policies for adaptation and mitigation throw additional 
considerations into the mix, and there is ample opportunity for tensions with established social 
priorities. Traditionally, welfare policies have trumped environmental policies, because direct 
human impacts from social ills such as poverty usually bite harder and/or more rapidly than do 
indirect effects of environmental deterioration, and because welfare systems have nurtured 
interest coalitions in their support. But as worries about climate change become more 
pronounced they will increasingly preoccupy decision makers. Climate policy measures (but also 
a failure to enact such measures) could undermine established social objectives. For example, 
carbon taxes will press more heavily on the poor, who spend a greater proportion of their income 
on energy. To date environmental protection absorbs a tiny proportion of state budgets (less than 
one percent according to OECD figures), and economic analyses suggest that a relatively robust 
mitigation response could be organized for no more than a few per cent of GDP (Stern Review 
2007). This is small compared to the overall scale of transfers involved in the welfare system, but 
to the extent that it consumes new social resources it will cause difficulties for further expanding 
entitlements. The real worry is that a serious mitigation response will be delayed for one or more 
decades, and that 1) the subsequent severity of the climate impacts, 2) the scale of the necessary 
adaptation activities, and 3) the cost of the delayed crash mitigation program that would 
ultimately be introduced, will result in much more serious economic losses. And at that point the 
urgency of addressing climate change might more significantly weaken state capacity to promote 
traditional welfare policy objectives. 
 
c) Viability of the current economic model 
 
Contemporary welfare states are predicated on an expansionary economic model, which assumes 
steadily rising material living standards, a gradually increasing population, and continuous 
economic growth. This provides jobs and business opportunities, generates tax revenues which 
finance welfare programs, and provides opportunities that discourage radical demands for wealth 
redistribution. But -- at least up until this point -- it also produces a growing environmental 
footprint of which greenhouse gas emissions are one manifestation. ‘Decoupling’ economic 
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activity from environmental pressures -- so that societies pollute less even as they grow more 
prosperous -- provides one way out of this dilemma. By changing ‘the quality of growth’, so that 
it does not harm the environment, development could become sustainable (WCED 1987). But so 
far evidence for such decoupling is weak: it has been achieved for some problems, in some 
countries, over fairly limited periods of time. In principle it should be possible to increase 
resource efficiencies, introduce innovative technologies, and reduce pollutant releases so that 
imposed environmental burdens fall dramatically.  
 
But to realize such absolute reductions in environmental pressures while population increases, 
and material consumption per capita also rises, would demand high and continuous performance 
improvements year after year. And given the magnitude of the absolute greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions required in coming decades to limit climate change to two degrees of 
temperature rise, achieving such decoupling represents an epochal challenge. Serious efforts to 
‘decouple’ carbon emissions from economic activity have not yet been made, so it is too early 
for a conclusive assessment. But if room is to be made for peoples in developing countries to 
raise their living standards (requiring higher resource use and waste generation), then developed 
countries are likely to have to turn their backs on the expansionary economic model that has so 
far provided the economic foundation for the welfare state.  This does not mean that 
‘development’ will cease; industrialised societies will still be able to increase well being: the 
moral, social, cultural and material position of their citizens. But this cannot be predicated on 
continuously expanding appropriation from limited natural endowments (arable land, forests, fish 
stocks, water, the absorptive capacity of the atmosphere, and so on).   
 
3. Rethinking welfare states: Decouple and decarbonise  
 
Addressing climate change requires a transformation of production/consumption practices that 
produce green house gas emissions; but it will also require a rethink of social welfare institutions 
built up over the last century. The ultimate consequences for Western welfare states are not clear. 
But following on from the discussion of economic models above, we can identify two broad, and 
very different, scenarios: a) using technological innovation to decouple economic growth from 
carbon emissions and at the same time decarbonise and re-orient the welfare state; b) move from 
a growth to a steady state economy and radically transform the meaning of welfare and the 
institutions for achieving it. We consider each in turn. 
 
Even within this more benign scenario (a) there remain severe implications for western welfare 
states. Proposals usually entail the idea of ‘policy integration’ – drawing together environment, 
economic and social decision making (Lenschow 2002, Nilsson and Eckerberg 2007, WCED 
1987). Achieving it in practice is critical to addressing the challenges cited above. Over time, 
welfare institutions will need to be adjusted to address climate risks; and climate policy must be 
structured to take account of equity. Potentially important issues and avenues for welfare state 
reform include the following. 
 
1. Green taxes plus adjustments to social security systems 
 
Green taxes have been much discussed but little implemented. General carbon taxes exist in 
Sweden and Denmark, and more specific taxes, notably on transport fuels, are high in several 
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European countries, such as the UK and Germany. However, the overall yield is small as a share 
of GDP and has fallen in the 00s. A recent UK fiscal commission studied the effect of raising 
green taxes to 20% of total tax revenues by 2020, to be offset by lower employer social security 
contributions, plus 10% spent on retrofitting houses and eco-innovation. The modelling 
suggested that this alone could achieve the UK’s commitment to reduce GHGs by 34% by 2020 
(over 1990 levels). Macro-economic effects would be minimal, except that employment would 
actually rise substantially due to lower employment costs (Green Fiscal 2009).  
 
However, the effects of the carbon taxation would be regressive, even with the tax offsets and the 
boost to employment, and policies to ensure fairness would be an essential corollary to ensure 
public support . Although lower income households spend less on energy, it accounts for a 
higher share of their income. In the UK 30% of the poorest quintile of households actually use 
more energy than the national average, mainly because they live in such fuel-inefficient houses. 
Similarly, rural residents are more reliant on cars. Thus carbon taxation requires complementary 
social policies, both to invest in low-emission housing, transport and communities, and to protect 
those with low incomes but high carbon consumption (Hills 2009). 
 
2. Develop eco-social investment 
 
By promoting eco-social investment governments can push down greenhouse gas emissions 
while simultaneously addressing social issues. Housing, a neglected part of welfare states, is an 
obvious area here. The IPCC Forth Assessment Report shows that baseline carbon emissions 
could be reduced in the residential sector by 29% at effectively no cost – the highest scope for 
reductions in any sector (Intergovernmental 2007b, p. 389). Countries with very inefficient 
houses, such as the UK, could achieve a win-win outcome by improving quality and reducing 
emissions. Building standards are much more stringent in, for example, Norway, Sweden and 
Germany: houses meeting their building codes use around one quarter of the energy of houses 
meeting the required standards in England and Wales (Monbiot 2006). However, since new 
building constitutes a tiny fraction of the housing stock, such improvement requires retrofitting 
millions of properties to a high standard. This could be supported through grants and tax relief, 
but existing research suggests it requires coordinated local government and community action to 
achieve the severe carbon reduction targets. The recent UK Climate Change Committee called 
for street-by-street retrofitting, in essence a new form of social investment policy (Committee 
2009). 
  
This would mark a shift towards an eco-social investment state. In some respects traditional 
welfare states have been reprioritising social investment over social protection in the last two 
decades, but this would mark a step-change.  Other areas for such investment include the 
development of public transportation and the transformation of urban form. In each case social 
policy goals (the improvement of the living conditions of citizens, disadvantaged groups, the 
elderly, and so on) can be combined with climate mitigation and adaptation efforts through 
public investment strategies. This strategy lies at the heart of recent ‘Green New Deal’ proposals 
(Nef 2008).  
 
3. Decarbonise existing social services 
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At the same time existing social services will need to decarbonise rapidly. The welfare state itself 
has a substantial carbon footprint. For example, the British National Health Service carbon 
footprint in 2004 was 18.6 mtCO2, some 25% of English public sector emissions, and it is rising 
fast (SDC UK Sustainable Development Commission 2008). Transforming energy and transport 
systems, developing green public procurement, and altering modes of service delivery could 
make substantial inroads here. There is huge scope to reduce the emissions footprint of 
government service delivery.  
 
4. Change consumer behaviour  
 
Welfare states all affect some domains of consumer behaviour, either explicitly (alcohol, drugs, 
parental care, job search, etc) or implicitly. Social policy affords valuable lessons here, for 
example in the successful reduction of smoking. Most countries have used all three basic means 
available to governments to shift behaviour: education and persuasion; taxation, subsidies and 
other monetary incentives; and regulation (including prohibition). But there is critical experience 
in social policy of their limits. Incentives that appeal solely to self-interest may fail when they 
degrade intrinsic motivations such as altruism and solidarity. Others recognize the limits of top-
down approaches and stress the need to engage people and communities in changing behaviour. 
Thus social policy can provide valuable lessons and templates in bringing about the much more 
epochal changes required to mitigate climate change. Yet, anti-smoking policies took 30 years to 
achieve their present impact, and even now about 30% of adults continue to smoke.  
 
The three areas of individual consumption that most directly effect carbon emissions are housing, 
transport, and food: housing primarily relates to space heating/cooling, water heating, and 
household appliances; transport relates to automobile usage and air travel; and food to meat 
consumption and ‘food miles’. In each case there is a complex relation between the potential for 
collective and individual action: changing consumer attitudes can result in different consumption 
choices that can have a substantial impact on aggregate emissions; but shifts in regulatory policy 
(for example building codes, product energy consumption standards, automobile emission 
standards, and so on) are also important.  
 
5. Utilise synergies 
 
On the bright side, there are considerable potential synergies between climate and, for example, 
health policies. One UK study concludes that a shift in transport from driving to walking and 
cycling, could bring about significant reductions in heart disease/stroke (10-20%), breast cancer 
(12-13%), dementia (8%) and depression (5%). Similarly, a 30% reduction in livestock 
production and consumption would reduce heart disease by 15% (excluding effects on all other 
obesity-related diseases) (Lancet). These improvements would, ceteris paribus, reduce demands 
on health services and save money. In 2009 overweight and obesity cost the NHS £4.8 billion.  If 
the incidence of obesity in all social classes had been the same as for social class 1, the cost 
would have been £2.2 billion, a reduction of 54 per cent. By 2025 the estimated total cost to the 
NHS of £8.9 billion would be reduced by £4.8 billion or 46 per cent if the effects of class 
inequalities were eliminated. This amounts to c10% of the current NHS budget (McPherson et al 
).
2
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Managing the issues discussed above will tax the administrative capacities of democratic 
political systems. It may well be that different welfare states will prove more or less capable to 
arriving at effective and equitable solutions. There is good evidence that the distinct welfare 
regimes within the developed world map on to environmental regimes: the advanced social 
democratic welfare states and coordinated market economies including Germany are major 
pioneers of environmental policies (Gough et al. 2008). These countries may be better placed to 
deliver than their liberal/Anglophone alternatives because their institutions and political culture 
enable an interventionist state acing to promote the public good. And it may also be that more 
elaborate systems of social support allow governments more latitude in promoting reforms with 
labour market impacts.   
 
 
4. Rethinking welfare states: zero growth and radical transformation 
 
Yet others profoundly doubt that de-coupling of the sweep and speed necessary can be achieved, 
and especially question whether we can move to a sustainable low carbon world whilst still 
maintaining growth in the rich countries (Jackson 2009). The case rests on arithmetic and ethics. 
To stabilise climate change on relatively optimistic assumptions will require global carbon 
emissions of below 4 billion tonnes per annum by 2050 or a twenty-fold improvement on the 
current global average. But even if this were achieved, it would allow for no greater catch-up by 
the developing world. The world in 2050 would be one of similarly egregious inequalities and 
suffering to the present; indeed absolute inequalities would be greater. And it would be a world 
of continuing cumulative income growth in the affluent West, with average incomes more than 
doubling again. To achieve a world where the entire population enjoyed an income comparable 
with EU citizens today, the world economy would need to grow 6 times between now and 2050, 
implying a technical shift of still higher orders of magnitude if climatic disaster is to be avoided. 
Jackson concludes: ‘There is no credible, socially-just, ecologically-sustainable scenario of 
continually growing incomes for a world of nine billion people’ (SDC 2009)p.57. 
 
If then the ‘growth state’ on which the welfare state was built is unsustainable in the West, the 
welfare state would have to transform. This would raise the following issues among others. 
 
1. Redistributing carbon 
 
As well as green taxes and regulation there would need to be a more explicit distribution and 
redistribution of carbon – for example, some form of Personal Carbon Allowances and Trading 
(PCAT). There is a wide variety of such proposals, but all entail a cap on a country’s total GHG 
emissions (decreasing year by year) and a division of this amount into equal annual allowances 
for each adult resident (often with a lower allowance for each child). In effect a dual accounting 
standard and currency is developed – energy has both a money price and a carbon ‘price’. Those 
who use less than the average could sell their surplus and gain, while higher users would pay a 
market price for their excess. Advocates claim many benefits: a PCAT scheme covering 
domestic energy, road fuel and air travel would be on average quite progressive; it would make 
real the carbon rationing required and could bring about behavioural change more directly and 
quickly. It could be implemented using a personal carbon card and smart metering, though the 
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administrative difficulties should not be underestimated. In effect it would constitute a carbon 
form of the Basic Income idea.  
 
Though PCAT would be inherently progressive, it raises similar issues of fairness to carbon 
taxation, concerning those living in inefficient or underutilised housing, or dependent on car 
travel, or with special needs. Too may exceptions to the standard allowance could undermine the 
scheme, but too few would result in ‘rough justice’, which could undermine public support. For 
these and other reasons the UK government is now winding down its support for testing the idea.  
 
2. Redistributing work and time 
 
Employment policy has always been at the core of the welfare state. The post-WW2 assumption 
was that adult men would work full-time and adult married women would undertake full-time 
unpaid housework perhaps with intermittent part-time labour. Since the 1960s, women have 
entered the paid labour force in growing numbers and policies have (slowly and variably) 
adapted to encourage this. In the 1990s there was a further policy shift notably in the 
Anglophone states to force or encourage benefit recipients to enter paid wage labour. In all this 
the official recognition of housework and care work has been absent or sporadic until recently.  
 
However, it is clear that moving towards a steady state economy must entail a significant cut in 
the share of time spent in paid work. This is so for several reasons, including: to break the habit 
of working to earn to consume, to distribute working time more evenly across the population, to 
reduce the ill-being associated with unemployment, and to enable a better balance between paid 
work and the variety of unpaid activities, such as child care, personal care, engagement in local 
activities etc. (This goes well beyond the typical economists’ trade-off between work and 
‘leisure’). In the simulations of the Canadian economy undertaken by Victor, a reduced working 
week emerges as a crucial necessary condition for a high-quality, no-growth economy (Victor 
2008). However, it is unquestionable that this policy shift too would raise serious distributional 
problems, including the risk of increasing poverty among the low paid and trade union 
opposition to its impact on earnings in all income brackets. The welfare state could play a role in 
radically redistributing work and time opportunities among individuals, but redistribution of 
incomes and wealth would also be necessary.  
 
3. Redistributing income and wealth 
 
Welfare states have always been compatible with substantial inequalities of wealth and income; 
but the more comprehensive social democratic welfare states are also those where economic 
inequalities are more restrained. To the extent that a low carbon economy slows traditional 
economic growth it may spark calls for more redistributive policies. Why might this be so? In the 
first place, resources to deal with climate change adaptation and mitigation will have to come 
from somewhere, and the argument can be made that the affluent can afford to contribute more. 
Second, if everyone is being asked to watch their carbon footprint, then the luxury consumption 
of the rich may fall under the spotlight. Third, since the conspicuous consumption of the affluent 
is about positional goods and helps drive fashion, it would be disproportionately important to 
curb excesses. Moreover, there is evidence that large income inequalities erodes the social 
solidarity required for an active public policy oriented to deal with common problems such as 
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climate change. The traditional redistributive case for welfare states is enhanced in a future of 
radical climate change mitigation. 
 
The upshot is that in a steady-state economy, a radically different welfare system would need to 
integrate the redistribution of carbon, work/ time, and income/ wealth. At present these are 
mainly studied, and policies developed, within separate silos, but that would need to change. 
More generally, this scenario would also require a new indicator system to monitor final well-
being and sustainability, as distinct from throughput measures such as GDP (Stiglitz et al. 2009). 
There is now substantial evidence that excessive economic growth beyond some point (that has 
been exceeded in most OECD countries) can harm both objective wellbeing and subjective 
wellbeing as well as environmental sustainability (Kasser 2002). The idea and measurement of 
wellbeing would be progressively dissociated from that of income and commodity consumption. 
 
4. Rethinking population policy 
 
To the extent that welfare states in developed countries have engaged with population size and 
growth rates, the concern has mainly been to reward larger families (in countries where birth 
rates have fallen near or below replacement levels), to address the problem of aging, and to 
manage immigration.  A steady state economy would ultimately be predicated on stable 
population levels. And since (other things being equal) more people imply more greenhouse gas 
emissions, climate change raises anew the question of appropriate population size. Jonathan 
Porritt, the recent Chair of the UK Sustainable Development Commission, for example, has 
warned that Britain must drastically reduce its population if it is to build a sustainable society. 
And the Optimum Population Trust advocates a goal of halving the UK’s present size to 30 
million people. Yet immigration is a sensitive political issue in most developed states and issues 
related to reproductive rights and family planning provoke serious controversy. How this is to be 
handled during the protracted period where population growth in developing countries remains 
high, and the economic inequalities between North and South remain pronounced, is unclear. Yet 
it is hard to imagine that this issue can be bracketed indefinitely, and sooner or later arguments 
about appropriate family size and population levels and growth rates will come to the fore.  
  
5. A second de-commodification? 
 
The above scenario for steady-state welfare would amount in effect to a second de-
commodification of capitalism. The first de-commodification, so memorably described by 
Polanyi, protected citizens from major social risks and insulated their living standards from 
dependence on wage payments. The counter-movement pressing for these reforms ultimately 
created welfare states – citizenship entitlements to common need satisfiers and social benefits 
mainly provided by public services paid for by taxes and social contributions. However, though 
entitlements were de-commodified, the services were produced in a commodified form. This 
second stage would entail a move towards de-commodified production – reducing working hours 
and commodity purchases, developing ‘co-production’ and fostering preventive social behaviour, 
among many other things. For example, in health and social care it would require a new 
emphasis on prevention over cure. This in turn would mean tapping the experiential knowledge 
of the populace, treating patients and citizens as ‘co-producers’ of health care, rather than as 
passive users. However, this would entail a direct and major challenge to existing health care 
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institutions and the interest groups supporting these – medical, managerial, pharmaceutical and 
financial. It would require a step-change transformation away from 20c health care. This 
conclusion has been generalised by some, to argue that traditional welfare states need to adapt to 
and integrate with the new ‘social economy’, comprising the civic and household economies 
(Nef 2009). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Climate change will both raise extra demands for ‘traditional’ social policy measures, add new 
demands to manage harmful consumption, generate new fiscal requirements for environmental 
policies and expenditures, and pose new distributional dilemmas for welfare states. This 
transformed landscape will impose major adaptations on welfare states. This will apply even if 
traditional economic growth patterns can be maintained to supply a growing stream of revenues 
to fund these new policy demands. Still more is this the case if proponents of steady-state 
economics are right and growth in the rich world is no longer feasible. 
 
However, can either scenario evolve in resilient, path dependent, inertial institutions such as 
established welfare states? There are at present few signs of the collective agency such a radical 
shift will require. The current conjuncture of capitalist crisis and dangerous climate change 
presents us with an unprecedented problem of system (dis)integration but without a coherent 
social movement to advance what appears to be the only sustainable solution. This leaves elite 
self-interest as the main stimulus for reform – a not inconsiderable resource. But the lessons from 
the history of welfare states suggest that radical reforms are most successful and durable when 
elite self-interest is combined with mobilisation and pressure from below. Of course it is always 
possible that a third option will prevail: societal paralysis, muddle along and hope for something 
to turn up…. 
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